What the academics don't teach you.

[Monad]

In 295 BC, during the Third Samnite War, Livy mentions that the consul Quintus Fabius Maximus Rullianus, did not intend to enlist "more than 4,000 infantry and 600 cavalry," to accompany him to the outgoing camp of the consul Appius Claudius Caecus. Later, Livy mentions that 2 legions and "less than 5,000 infantry and cavalry," that had arrived with the consul Quintus Fabius Maximus Rullianus remained in Etruria.

Here, Livy is describing the replacement system for a consular army. Livy's figure of "of 4,000 infantry and 600 cavalry" are the replacements, which means those 4,000 infantry and 600 cavalry that had completed their required number of military campaigns are being discharged, thereby leaving in Etruria the equivalent of "2 legions and "less than 5,000 infantry and cavalry," which itself is badly written because Livy or his source is just added the replacements to 2 legions, which is wrong as the four legions in the consular army will each discharge 1,000 infantry that previously belonged to the outgoing consul Appius Claudius Caecus. The 600 cavalry replacements as given by Livy is also incorrect as the number of Roman cavalry has been double counted. This is because the number of cavalry centuries for 600 cavalry is greater than the number of infantry centuries. Using the ancient rounding system, there should be 4,000 infantry and 400 cavalry. With a consular army (4 legions) allocated 4,000 infantry and 400 cavalry replacements, this means a praetorian army (2 legions) would have 2,000 infantry and 200 cavalry replacements. In 195 BC, Livy mentions that the praetor Appius Claudius Nero (Iberia Ulterior) was authorised to raise 2,000 infantry replacements and 200 cavalry replacements. The praetor Publius Manlius (Iberia Citerior) was also to raise 2,000 infantry and 200 cavalry replacements, which is correct.

The Third Samnite War introduced this new replacement system, as well as the Romans fighting with allies for the first time. Livy's references to the Roman army being accompanied by allies previous to the Third Samnite War are incorrect as not supported by the data in the ancient sources.

In 216 BC, Polybius has the consul Aemilius Paullus enrol replacement soldiers, which were then dispatched to both proconsuls, Gnaeus Servilius Geminus and Atilius Regulus at Apulia. Livy mentions 10,000 recruits were levied to make up for any losses. The replacements for the 2 proconsular armies at Apulia would amount to 8,800 men (8,000 infantry and 800 cavalry), which produces a rounding of 1,200 men, which is common when the numbers get larger. However, with the inclusion of the replacement officers and supernumeraries, the figure tilts to over 9,000 men.

So far, all the replacement numbers from the Third Samnite War to the end of the Second Punic War, fit the replacement system and levy system of campaign batches as given by Polybius. It all falls into place, that is all those men in the last campaign division batch are being replaced, which means 8,800 men in the lowest campaign batch are being sent to Apulia to face Hannibal. Therefore, with the inclusion of Paullus and Varro's consular armies, there would be 17,600 new recruits at Cannae, which does not support Livy's statement that two thirds were recruits, because 80,000 infantry divided by 3 makes over 26,000 men. However, with the removal of the rounding concerning the 17,600 men given above, Livy or his source has made a very common mistake, and when corrected one third should be recruits and not two thirds. Livy has taken the complete number of new recruits, both Roman and allied for the whole army at Cannae, and deducted all the new recruits from the total number of allied troops at Cannae. Livy or his source should have used a ruler when examining the sources. The finger as it crossed the page must have moved up or down slightly to arrive at the allied numbers column, and realising the new recruits were equivalent to one third of the allied troops, erroneously wrote two thirds instead of one third. In conclusion, the number of recruits for the whole army equals one third of the allied troops for the whole army.

In 198 BC, the consul Titus Quinctius Flaminius was assigned Macedonia, with 3,000 Roman infantry, 300 Roman cavalry, 5,000 allied infantry and 500 allied cavalry so as to bring the legions up to their proper strength. This gives a total of 8,000 infantry and 800 cavalry replacements for a consular army. In 152 BC, Appian has Marcus Claudius Marcellus travel to Iberia with 8,000 infantry and 500 cavalry, which from the example of 198 BC is missing 300 cavalry. In 197 BC, the proconsul Titus Quinctius Flaminius was allocated 6,000 infantry replacements and 300 cavalry replacements. The 2 praetors in Iberia Marcus Helvius (Farther Iberia) and Gaius Sempronius Tuditanus (Hither Iberia) were allocated 8,000 allied infantry and 400 cavalry, which were to take the place of the old army, which was to be sent home. This would allocate each praetor 4,000 infantry and 200 cavalry.

At face value, it would appear that the number of replacements has doubled, and for years I worked with this premise, even though I was fully aware it no longer conformed to Polybius' campaign batches as described in his levy system. What has now been exposed is the doubling of the numbers has come about because someone has included those men being discharged with the replacements and the person behind this is Polybius. My rational behind this is on many occasions, when detailing the levy system after the Second Punic War, Livy mentions legions of 5,200 infantry, which is Polybius' incorrect legion. For me, this shows Polybius is Livy's source. So, this means, that in 198 BC, the consul Titus Quinctius Flaminius' 8,000 infantry and 800 cavalry replacements should be corrected to 4,000 infantry replacements, 400 cavalry replacements, 4,000 discharged infantry and 400 discharged cavalry.

The following year, in 197 BC, Titus Quinctius Flaminius is allocated 6,000 infantry and 300 cavalry replacements, which is missing 2,000 infantry and 500 cavalry. Those infamous 6,000 replacement infantry have an interesting history. For the Macedonian army at Cynoscephalae Livy's list of allied and Macedonian contingents amounts to 25,500 men, consisting of 16000 phalangites, 2000 Peltasts, 2000 Thracians, 2000 Illyrians, 1500 Mercenaries, and 2000 cavalry. The 16,000 phalangites are legionary infantry minus the camp guards and the 2000 Peltasts, 2000 Thracians, 2000 Illyrians, which amount to 6,000 infantry, are Titus Quinctius Flaminius infamous 6,000 infantry replacements. According to Livy, on the very day the battle of Cynoscephalae was being fought, the Achaeans routed a Macedonian force at Corinth, which consisted of 6,000 men. Again, a recycled number.

At Cynoscephalae, Livy has the Roman army accompanied by 3,000 foreign allies, consisting of 600 Aetolian infantry, 400 Aetolian cavalry, 1,200 Athamanian infantry, 300 Apollonian infantry and 500 Gortynian infantry. These 3,000 men consist of all the consular cavalry (Roman and allied) + consular cavalry replacements + discharged consular cavalry + rounding = 3,000 men.

In 191 BC, the praetor Lucius Aemilius Paullus was assigned Iberia Ulterior, while the propraetor Gaius Flaminius remained in Hither Iberia Citerior. Livy claims both were each allocated 3,000 infantry and 300 cavalry, of which one-third was Roman and two-thirds were allies. (3) By following Livy, his figures amount to 6,600 men (6,000 infantry and 600 cavalry), consisting of 2,000 Roman infantry, 200 Roman cavalry, 4,000 allied infantry and 400 allied cavalry. Livy's comment that one-third was Roman and two-thirds were allies only applies to the cavalry, not infantry. The golden rule is the number of Roman and allied infantry replacements are equal. This means each praetor should have 4,400 men (2,000 replacement infantry, 2,000 discharged infantry, 200 replacement cavalry and 200 discharged cavalry) Therefore, each praetor is missing 1,000 discharged infantry and 100 discharged cavalry.

According to Livy, in 195 BC, under the orders of the new praetor, Appius Claudius Nero, the outgoing propraetor Marcus Helvius was sent from Iberia Ulterior to Marcus Porcius Cato's camp with 6,000 men. Missing are the 2,000 infantry replacements and the 2,000 infantry being discharged, thereby producing a praetorian army of 10,000 infantry. Following Livy, this force of 6,000 men was attacked by 20,000 Celtiberians, of which the Romans managed to kill 12,000 Celtiberians. The 12,000 Celtiberians killed represents Marcus Porcius Cato's consular army (20,000 infantry) minus the 4000 infantry being replaced and the 4,000 infantry being discharged for a consular army.

In 153 BC, Appian allocates the consul Quintus Fulvius Nobilior an army of 30,000 men. Following the ancient historians' practice that a consul army had 22,000 men (20,000 infantry and 2,000 cavalry), the additional 8,000 men consist of 4,000 replacements and 4,000 discharged infantry. When the 8,000 infantry are deducted from the 20,000 infantry, this leaves 12,000 infantry. A Celtiberian army of 20,000 infantry (a consular army) and 5,000 cavalry ambushed the consul Nobilior, with 6,000 Roman citizens killed. The 5,000 cavalry consists of the cavalry for 2 consular armies and 1 praetorian army (2,000 + 2,000 + 1,000 = 5,000).

In 154 BC, in Iberia, Appian has the Lusitanians defeat the praetors, Lucius Manilius and Lucius Calpurnius Piso, with a loss of 6,000 Romans killed. So, the 2,000 infantry replacements and 2,000 discharged infantry have been deducted from a praetorian army of 10,000 infantry.

In 147 BC, Appian reports that 10,000 Lusitanians overran Turditiania. (1) The praetor Gaius Vetilius marched against the Lusitanians with "about" 10,000 men. With a praetor allocated 10,000 infantry, the 10,000 Lusitanians has been taken from Gaius Vetilius' praetorian army. This is a pretty lazy attempt at disguising what you are doing.

In 199 BC, the praetor Gnaeus Baebius Tamphilus, who succeeded the consul Gaius Aurelius Cotta in Gaul, invaded the country of the Insubrian Gauls, and because of his lack of caution was ambushed, and lost 6,700 men. In many other incidences, this number gets rounded to 7,000 men or "about" 7,000 men.

Here's the problem. Since Lipsius wrote the first book on the Roman army in 1596, the whole history of the Roman army has been based on MISTAKES, which means nearly everything written by academia about the size and organisation of the Roman legion is wrong. All ancient historians have made mistake, none better or worse than the other. Even the Servian constitution is based on a mistake, that can be prove to be so.

To my knowledge, there is no academic study on the Roman replacement system, that I am not even sure academia knows of its existence. And yet, the information concerning such a system is a tsunami in itself. There is no shortage of data. Having for years read academic journals and hearing their cries of a paucity of information, it is mind boggling to try and understand why hundreds of pieces of data as provided by the ancient historians has been completely ignored. All we have been served up for the last 430 years is cherry picking. There is no excuse for this.

The data as found in the ancient sources provide a mass of information about the Roman legion and its organisation. I have found the vexillation organisation going back to 400 BC, the numerus organisation popping up during the 190's BC and other organisation unknown to most academics. What academia have overlooked is Varro's comment that a cohort is a grouping of maniples. The importance of this comment is Varro does not state the number of maniples in a cohort. Polybius gives 3 maniple to a cohort, but 2 maniples grouped can also be termed a cohort, as could 6 maniples. The term cohort in the ancient sources is used to describe a grouping of maniples, without being specific to their number. A vexillation is a grouping of maniples, so is a numerus. What makes them different is the number of maniples they contain. The other disastrous practice employed by academics is the so-called "reliable" rating. Polybius is more reliable than Livy because Polybius lived closer to the event. Well, have you read about the competency of eye witness in today's modern world. I still have not found the definitive study that proves Polybius is more reliable than Livy because it has not been undertaken. If one reads all the books on the Roman legion since Lipsius, the arguments are still the same, and it shows that academics have been following and copying the generations of academics before them. No one has stepped off the path, so the same misinformation keeps getting regurgitated.

[DBS]

For the Macedonian army at Cynoscephalae Livy's list of allied and Macedonian contingents amounts to 25,500 men, consisting of 16000 phalangites, 2000 Peltasts, 2000 Thracians, 2000 Illyrians, 1500 Mercenaries, and 2000 cavalry. The 16,000 phalangites are legionary infantry minus the camp guards and the 2000 Peltasts, 2000 Thracians, 2000 Illyrians, which amount to 6,000 infantry, are Titus Quinctius Flaminius infamous 6,000 infantry replacements.

I am sorry, but yet again you are pushing your idea, with absolutely zero actual evidence, that figures given for one side in a battle or campaign have been lifted from the opponents, and that you can level this charge at any ancient source just to make it fit your notions.  If nothing else, this is why you struggle to get anyone to take you seriously.  If you blithely dismiss anything inconvenient in the ancient sources as "Livy (or Polybius or whoever) has made a mistake", without very good reason, such as from another ancient source, but simply because you do not like it, then you are standing into very serious intellectual danger.  Yes, Livy and Polybius doubtless did make mistakes, but this obsession with numbers and arithmetic is ridiculous.  If you had any experience of actual military campaigns and logistics, you would know that the numbers game is the very first thing that unravels, whether through sickness, casualties, or equipment shortfalls.  Also, public reporting always rounds as a) the numbers actually available in a campaign vary day by day, and b) rounding off to the nearest hundred or thousand is all the accuracy anyone needs, even a general.  Only a platoon commander / centurion is worried about the precise number in his sub-unit.

Perhaps if you refrained from provocative titles such as, "What the academics don't teach you," it might also help your case?  These are very tolerant fora, but if you think you are winning anyone here over to your perspective, I fear you are most likely mistaken.

Personally, I am thankful that no academic ever tried to sell me anything like this...

[Erpingham]

Step carefully here, gentlemen. Debating methodologies is fine, provided it doesn't descend into ad hominem territory (which it hasn't so far).

(Moderator hat off)

Historiography and the critical examination of ancient texts are important tools for historical study and personally I don't know much about it in this period. While closeness in time to events is important, access to information and reliability of transmission is also key. We, after all, use Arrian as a reliable source on Alexander, even though he wrote hundreds of years later, because of his access to contemporary sources which we no longer have.

[Jim Webster]

Step carefully here, gentlemen. Debating methodologies is fine, provided it doesn't descend into ad hominem territory (which it hasn't so far).

(Moderator hat off)

Historiography and the critical examination of ancient texts are important tools for historical study and personally I don't know much about it in this period. While closeness in time to events is important, access to information and reliability of transmission is also key. We, after all, use Arrian as a reliable source on Alexander, even though he wrote hundreds of years later, because of his access to contemporary sources which we no longer have.

The problem we have with the Romans is lack of contemporary sources. As far as I could make out there was Quintus Fabius Pictor who lived from about 270BC to about 200BC. There was also Lucius Cincius Alimentus who took part in the Second Punic War and was a prisoner of Hannibal. He seems to have used the annals of the Pontifex Maximus and other sources.  We are not entirely sure what they contained and how much detail they went into.
However I would recommend Elizabeth H Pearson's PhD 'The Development of Army Administration in the Roman Republic'

It looks at David's point of at what level records were kept, how they were kept, and where they were stored. This is unit strengths etc and details about just who had died etc. Also who was owed what, and what deductions had to be made from it. Some of these details would be settled when men got back from Rome.
Also there had to be service records because men only needed to serve for so many years. I found it fascinating.

But one question that did occur to me was that did men stay in the same rank and also the same unit. As an example, after a battle your Hastati might have taken a lot of casualties. If you have some velites who have picked up some useful armour in the pursuit, could they have been moved to being hastati?

[DBS]

Likewise, even in an easy engagement when Republican Romans steamrollered an opponent, the very nature of their structure and tactics mean that the heaviest casualties (in relative rather than absolute terms) are going to fall on the hastati and, possibly, the velites.  If the battle did not reach the principes, let alone the triarii, they are not likely to have suffered many, if any, losses.  Even if the battle is hardfought, one might expect the hastati to suffer more than the others.  Therefore, a neat proportionate structure starts looking quite tatty after a while.  Does not mean that the legion ceases to be effective, nor that its deployment or tactics need to change, just that a rigid numerical calculation is irrelevant.

[Adrian Nayler]

But one question that did occur to me was that did men stay in the same rank and also the same unit. As an example, after a battle your Hastati might have taken a lot of casualties. If you have some velites who have picked up some useful armour in the pursuit, could they have been moved to being hastati?

My impression is that the 'system' intended to move men between the various classes (velites, hastati, pricipes and triarii) which was, after all, based largely on age (with experience likely being assumed to accompany age). When campaigning was over the soldiers were discharged and, if selected to serve in subsequent years, were mustered anew in fresh legions with little sense of continuity except in their administrative numeral (First or Third, etc.).

Generals seem to have spent time 'training' their armies before setting out for serious campaigning. Whilst some of that time would no doubt be weapons- and formation-based, I suspect much of its value lay in acquainting the new soldiers with one another and instilling some rudimentary cohesion amongst strangers. I wonder whether the soldiers themselves may have actively advocated their own quality and experience when attending the dilectus, hoping for the best deal, as they perceived it, especially as regards rank and precedence.

With respect to Jim's specific query, I suspect we have little evidence for how the personnel of armies may have been expediently re-arranged in response to campaign conditions by their general.

The velites included both the youngest and the poorest soldiers. We should remember that assessment is relative – all the soldiers have met the property qualification to serve (and are thus not 'poor' in an absolute sense). An older 'poor' man might be assigned to the velites due to his inability to provide all the equipment required for service in the principes. Should he have a campaign windfall and acquire spoils and/or the monies to purchase such from the market assumed to accompany the army, I see no reason why he might not be moved there if the officers deemed it necessary.

[DBS]

The one occasion when there might need to have been a major reorganisation was with those men who survived Cannae.  They will not have been a nice tidy legion multiple - we do not even know the breakdown between Roman citizens and allies.  Instead they were bundled into two legions and sent off to Sicily; and no question of "time-expired" soldiers getting to go home either.  Are they remaining in their 216 classes, or reorganised into a more balanced force?  I suspect not, even if that meant an imbalance.

[Jim Webster]

The one occasion when there might need to have been a major reorganisation was with those men who survived Cannae.  They will not have been a nice tidy legion multiple - we do not even know the breakdown between Roman citizens and allies.  Instead they were bundled into two legions and sent off to Sicily; and no question of "time-expired" soldiers getting to go home either.  Are they remaining in their 216 classes, or reorganised into a more balanced force?  I suspect not, even if that meant an imbalance.

It's like the legion sent to Sardinia in 215BC, it had 'the wrong number of cavalry' and at the same time wasn't brigaded with an allied ala
Except that the general stripped the oarsmen off his ships and drafted them into some sort of formations 

[Monad]

I am sorry, but yet again you are pushing your idea, with absolutely zero actual evidence, that figures given for one side in a battle or campaign have been lifted from the opponents, and that you can level this charge at any ancient source just to make it fit your notions.

I don't make anything fit my notions David, I don't have to because my notions are produced by the ancient sources. I have plenty of evidence showing that the Roman army figures have been used for enemy numbers. I've posted on this very forum in various posts as also papers on academia. I would like you David, to provide evidence that supports your claim. So far, you provide opinions, which is the lowest form of human knowledge. You produce a lot of opinions, and continue to support them with more opinions.

If nothing else, this is why you struggle to get anyone to take you seriously.  If you blithely dismiss anything inconvenient in the ancient sources as "Livy (or Polybius or whoever) has made a mistake", without very good reason, such as from another ancient source, but simply because you do not like it, then you are standing into very serious intellectual danger.

Now you are twisting this around and putting words into my mouth.

Yes, Livy and Polybius doubtless did make mistakes, but this obsession with numbers and arithmetic is ridiculous.

Why are you accusing me of having Polybius and Livy making mistakes "without good reason", and yet here you are claiming they did make mistakes. Can you name some of their mistakes? Also, concerning my "obsession" with numbers and arithmetic being ridiculous," I have not been informed of some sacred taboo that must not be undertaken. You seem to forget that analysing the numbers is a perfectly valid way to interrogate the sources. In reality, questioning the numerical figures of ancient sources is a standard and necessary part of historiography. Those numbers in the ancient sources are there for a reason. Your comment condemns every academic that has done so. Sadly, I would add that academia needs to get a lot more "obsession" and get down and get dirty with the numbers instead of ignoring them. I am quite content to subjected the numbers in the ancient sources to intense arithmetical scrutiny because those tidy figures handed down in the ancient text are often literary constructs, not battlefield realities. Stress-testing these ancient numbers isn't a 'ridiculous obsession'—it is how we separate propaganda from history.

If you had any experience of actual military campaigns and logistics, you would know that the numbers game is the very first thing that unravels, whether through sickness, casualties, or equipment shortfalls.

I agree completely. However, the numbers in the ancient sources are not based on the actual number of men that were sick or died or were taken prisoner. I'm convinced they had no idea. Because the ancient historians had no real enemy numbers, that is killed or captured, they made them up and based them on the actual Roman army size, minus the camp guards, or all the cavalry, or add the cavalry to the camp guards, or deducted the camp guards again from the army that faced the enemy that already had the camp guards deducted, or used only the allied contingent. I only gave you two examples for Cynoscephalae because my posting was a general overview. The other number explanations I provided, you have avoided.

Perhaps if you refrained from provocative titles such as, "What the academics don't teach you," it might also help your case?  These are very tolerant fora, but if you think you are winning anyone here over to your perspective, I fear you are most likely mistaken.

You are speaking for everyone now? Not that concerned about their perspective. The usual suspects always give anyone a "like" if they having a go at me, goes back to the Ancmed days. I generally post about my research because I found what pops up to be interesting and am happy to share it in a general manner. I'm not sure what happens behind the scene on this forum, but plenty do communicate with me privately and not publicly.

I admit the title was a bit provocative. I don't find all academics useless. I place Phil Sabin in the category of critical thinker. However, I do find it somewhat boring that I am challenged on this forum in the same old manner, that is never challenged directly about the numbers provided. Everyone dances around them, well actually ignores them, and finds some other superficial way to claim I am wrong. In the name of god, give me a fair debate.

Personally, I am thankful that no academic ever tried to sell me anything like this...

I'm not an academic. I appreciate the debate, even if we don't see eye to eye. We can let the rest of the forum decide for themselves.

My impression is that the 'system' intended to move men between the various classes (velites, hastati, pricipes and triarii) which was, after all, based largely on age (with experience likely being assumed to accompany age).

Here is my take on this. A legion had 4,800 infantry (1.200 velites, 1,800 hastati, 1,200 princeps and 600 triarii), broken into the following:

Property Class IV 600 younger hastati
Property Class III 600 young hastati
Property Class II 600 oldest hastati

Property Class I 600 younger princeps
Property Class I 600 older princeps
Property Class I 600 triarii

Property Class V 1200 velites and 60 musicians
Property Class VI 60 artificers

Markus, being around 17 years of age starts as a Class IV hastati. His equipment is provided by the state and therefore has to pay the war tax for being Class IV. He undertakes 2 campaigns consecutively. Due to having peace and other factors, years later Markus is selected for the levy. However, he is too old to be rated as a Class IV hastati but is now the right age bracket to be a Class II hastati, so he pays the Class II war tax for his equipment. This leaves the possibility that Markus could complete his final campaign as a triarii, and would therefore pay the war tax allocated to Class I.

With respect to Jim's specific query, I suspect we have little evidence for how the personnel of armies may have been expediently re-arranged in response to campaign conditions by their general.

180 BC. The propraetor Quintus Fulvius Flaccus was ordered to discharge any Roman and allied (time-expired) troops. (Livy 40 39 1), (Orosius 4 20) On his arrival in his province in Iberia, the praetor Tiberius Sempronius Gracchus was to disband Quintus Fulvius Flaccus' old soldiers (Roman and allied), that had been transferred to Iberia prior to 186 BC, and then incorporate the replacements brought over by the praetor Tiberius Sempronius Gracchus into the various centuries, maniples and cohorts, and then reorganise the whole army. (Livy 40 39-40) Livy (40 36) further writes that with the addition of the reinforcements; the 2 legions had been raised above their normal strength of 14,000 infantry and 600 cavalry.

It's like the legion sent to Sardinia in 215BC, it had 'the wrong number of cavalry' and at the same time wasn't brigaded with an allied ala

Livy (23 34) the Roman senate dispatch 5,000 infantry and 400 cavalry to Sardinia. Have you actually proven whether the cavalry numbers are "the wrong number"?

[Jim Webster]

It's like the legion sent to Sardinia in 215BC, it had 'the wrong number of cavalry' and at the same time wasn't brigaded with an allied ala

Livy (23 34) the Roman senate dispatch 5,000 infantry and 400 cavalry to Sardinia. Have you actually proven whether the cavalry numbers are "the wrong number"?

define proven they are the wrong number

[Monad]

define proven they are the wrong number

You wrote "it had the wrong number of cavalry." How did you come to that conclusion?

[Jim Webster]

I gave it as an example of how bad the situation had got for Rome.
It is the year after Cannae
Things are so bad, to quote Orosius, Book 4 16

"The Romans, daring to breathe again, and emerging, as it were, from death to the hope of life, chose Decimus Junius dictator. He made a levy of those above seventeen years of age and gathered fifteen legions of immature and untrained soldiery.  With a promise of freedom he then induced slaves of proven strength and purpose to take the military oath. Some of these slaves volunteered, but others, when urgently needed, were bought with public money. The arms that were lacking were taken from the temples, and private wealth poured into the impoverished public treasury. The equestrian order as well as the frightened plebeians forgot their own interests and planned for the common welfare. 9 The dictator Junius, resuming an ancient practice of the days of Rome's misery, in order to reinforce the army, decreed that all men subject to punishment for crime or debt should be promised immunity and turned over to the military service - opening for them, as it were, a haven of refuge. Their number amounted to six thousand. "
https://www.attalus.org/translate/orosius4B.html#16

Livy's comments about the same period
"Armour, weapons, and other things of the kind were ordered to be in readiness, and the ancient spoils gathered from the enemy were taken down from the temples and colonnades. The dearth of freemen necessitated a new kind of enlistment; 8000 sturdy youths from amongst the slaves were armed at the public cost, after they had each been asked whether they were willing to serve or no." Immediately after Cannae. "A levy was ordered, and all from seventeen years upwards were enrolled, some even younger; out of these recruits four legions were formed and 1000 cavalry."

So on arriving on Sardinia, Manlius Torquatus (to quote Livy) "He hauled ashore his war-ships and furnished the seamen and rowers with arms, so that they might be available for service on land"

Note being oarsmen they are most unlikely to have met the property qualification to serve in the land forces of their own city.

The Senate even devalued the currency
https://www.geochemicalperspectivesletters.org/article1613/

The defeat of Hannibal's armies at the culmination of the Second Punic War (218 BC–201 BC) was a defining moment in Western world history. One of the underappreciated consequences of the conflict was the Roman monetary reform of 211 BC, which ushered in a monetary system that would sustain Roman power for the next many centuries. This system would encapsulate many of the issues plaguing finances of governments until today, such as inflation, debasement, and the size of monetary mass. Here we approach the issue of financial fluxes using a newly developed powerful tracer, that of silver isotopic compositions, in conjunction with Pb isotopes, both of which we measured in Roman coinage minted before and after the 211 BC monetary reform. The results indicate that pre-reform silver was minted from Spanish metal supplied by Carthage as war penalty after the First Punic War, whereas post-reform silver was isotopically distinct and dominated by plunder, most likely from Syracuse and Capua. The 211 BC monetary reform and the end of debasement, therefore, were aimed at accommodating new sources of silver rather than being the response to financial duress. The drastic weight reduction of silver coins implemented by the Roman mint was not motivated by metal shortage but by the need to block inflation after a major surge of war booty.



The Roman Senate, and its commanders were so hand to mouth that they were taking whatever men they could find, ignoring property qualifications, wealth, or even citizenship. They even devalued the currency and paid their bills in dodgy money.
But it's war, it's what people do, they don't stick to esoteric systems which look so satisfying in peace time. 

[DBS]

However, the numbers in the ancient sources are not based on the actual number of men that were sick or died or were taken prisoner. I'm convinced they had no idea. Because the ancient historians had no real enemy numbers, that is killed or captured, they made them up and based them on the actual Roman army size, minus the camp guards, or all the cavalry, or add the cavalry to the camp guards, or deducted the camp guards again from the army that faced the enemy that already had the camp guards deducted, or used only the allied contingent.

This.  You are convinced they had no idea.  Leaving aside that at least when the Romans won they would know how many prisoners they had taken, and roughly how many they had killed (not just because of the logistic demands of feeding the prisoners and looting the dead, but because they were criteria for claiming a triumph, and any magistrate who could not offer some evidence would be in trouble with his political enemies), you have dredged up from nowhere the fantasy that they instead fabricated the numbers based on their own strength.  There is zero evidence for this, zero.  You forget that the Roman soldiers are also the electorate.  They would quickly cry foul if wholesale fabrication was in play.  The tribunes are ambitious men, hoping to be consuls themselves some day.  They are not going to play along.  And these assorted fellows will have a broad idea as to how many opponents they faced, because they will have been looking at them and working out whether they have a broader or narrower frontage, shallower or deeper ranks, than their own commands.

[Jim Webster]

Leaving aside that at least when the Romans won they would know how many prisoners they had taken, and roughly how many they had killed (not just because of the logistic demands of feeding the prisoners and looting the dead, but because they were criteria for claiming a triumph, and any magistrate who could not offer some evidence would be in trouble with his political enemies),

Also prisoners taken might be ransomed or sold into slavery. This money would have to be tracked very carefully to avoid light fingered pilfering. Accounts would have to be presented. These are not figures anybody would make up

[Monad]

You are convinced they had no idea.  Leaving aside that at least when the Romans won they would know how many prisoners they had taken, and roughly how many they had killed (not just because of the logistic demands of feeding the prisoners and looting the dead, but because they were criteria for claiming a triumph, and any magistrate who could not offer some evidence would be in trouble with his political enemies), you have dredged up from nowhere the fantasy that they instead fabricated the numbers based on their own strength. 

Actually, it is not my own idea, it is backed up by 5 volumes of research and over 1,000 pages of examined data to prove otherwise. I would like your opinion of this quote from Orosius (4 1 12-13):

"For it is certainly not the custom of writers of olden times to preserve for posterity the number of the victor's dead, lest the losses tarnish the glory of the victory, unless by chance so few fall that the numbers lost enhances the admiration for and the fear of the victor's courage. This was the case with Alexander the Great in the first battle of the Persian War. It is reported that his army lost only 9 infantrymen, whereas the enemy's losses numbered 400,000."

Let's reiterate Orosius "For it is certainly not the custom of writers of olden times to preserve for posterity the number of the victor's dead." How do you explain this.

You forget that the Roman soldiers are also the electorate.  They would quickly cry foul if wholesale fabrication was in play.  The tribunes are ambitious men, hoping to be consuls themselves some day.  They are not going to play along. 

I'll state my case again, we are talking about what the ancient writers wrote well after the event, like many, many years later, even a century later. And taken from accounts that would have been rewritten a few times. There was no conspiracy on the day as you claim. No one is covering it up on the day. I'll state my case again, the ancient historian did not the data to enemy killed, captured, or sold as slaves and to who. To give their work some credibility, or interest, they concocted enemy numbers, and this practice continues to where my research stops and that is the fall of Rome in 410 AD.

On a positive note, these causality figures also act to confirm the accuracy of the size and organisation of the Roman army and fleet for a particular period.

Here I will present the naval battle of Mylae in 260 BC.

260 BC: Mylae
According to Polybius, when the other consul Gaius Duilius learnt of the capture of the consul Gnaeus Cornelius Scipio, and further learning the Carthaginian fleet was ravaging Mylae, Gaius Duilius gave command of his four legions to the military tribunes, and took over command of the consular fleet. The Roman fleet then sailed from Messana to Mylae. (1)

Polybius has the Roman fleet as consisting of the whole force. Diodorus numbers the Roman fleet at 120 quinqueremes, while Orosius numbers the Roman fleet at 130 quinqueremes. (2) Diodorus' 120 Roman quinqueremes have been rounded from 128 quinqueremes. This has been achieved by rounding each of the 4 legions of 32 quinqueremes to 30 infantry quinqueremes and then multiplying the 30 quinqueremes by the 4 legions in a consular army. Orosius' 130 quinqueremes have been rounded from either the 128 infantry quinqueremes or the 132 quinqueremes (128 infantry quinqueremes and 4 cavalry quinqueremes). This means from a consular fleet of 185 ships, 132 quinqueremes engaged the Carthaginian fleet, leaving a revictual fleet of 53 ships to protect the anchorage at Messana:

Consul Fleet   
128 infantry quinqueremes   
  4 cavalry quinqueremes     
132 quinqueremes   
   
Revictual Fleet
 32 infantry quinqueremes
1 cavalry quinquereme
20 horse transports
 53 ships

Diodorus' claims the Carthaginian fleet at Mylae amounted to 200 ships which has possibly been rounded from the 185 ships belonging to the consular fleet of Gaius Duilius. (3)

Carthaginian Ship Casualties
The number of Carthaginian ships sunk or captured at Mylae is given below:

Polybius 50 ships sunk
Eutropius 14 ships sunk, 31 ships captured, 7,000 men killed, 3,000 captured
Orosius 13 ships sunk, 31 ships captured, 7,000 men killed, 3,000 captured
CIL 12 2 25 13 ships sunk, 30 ships captured


Polybius' figure of 50 Carthaginian ships sunk has been rounded from the 53 ships of the Roman revictual fleet at Messana.

  8 rorarii/leves quinqueremes
12 hastati quinqueremes
  8 princeps quinqueremes
  4 triarii quinqueremes
32 infantry quinqueremes
  1 cavalry quinquereme
33 quinqueremes
20 horse transports
53 ships

Eutropius and Orosius' 31 Carthaginian ships captured represents the 32 infantry quinqueremes of the revictual fleet being rounded to 30 infantry quinqueremes. To this has been added the single cavalry quinquereme. The 30 Carthaginian ships captured has been rounded from the 32 infantry quinqueremes of the revictual fleet.

The 13 Carthaginian ships sunk as given by Orosius and CIL 12 2 25 has been arrived by deducting the 20 horse transports from the 33 quinqueremes (33 minus 20 = 13). Eutropius' 14 Carthaginian ships sunk has simply been rounded from the 13 Carthaginian ships as given by Orosius and CIL 12 2 25. Eutropius and Orosius' manpower numbers have been based on a quinquereme having 300 rowers. Eutropius and Orosius' 10,000 causalities have been based on the 33 quinqueremes (32 infantry and 1 cavalry quinquereme) from the revictual fleet of 53 ships. Eutropius and Orosius' 7,000 rowers killed has been rounded from the 7,200 rowers belonging to the following 24 quinqueremes:

  8 rorarii/leves quinqueremes    2400 rowers
12 hastati quinqueremes    3600 rowers
  4 triarii quinqueremes    1200 rowers
24 quinqueremes    7200 rowers

Eutropius and Orosius' 3,000 rowers captured has been rounded from 2,700 rowers, belonging to the following 9 quinqueremes:

  8 princeps quinqueremes    2400 rowers
  1 cavalry quinquereme      300 rowers
9 quinqueremes    2700 rowers

The 7,200 rowers killed and the 2,700 rowers captured amount to 9,900 rowers, and when divided by 300 rowers per quinquereme, produces 33 quinqueremes (32 infantry and 1 cavalry quinquereme). In conclusion, the Carthaginian ship losses at Mylae are unknown and have been established on a Roman consular revictual fleet.

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