Assyrian Infantry in Achaemenid service

[dwkay57]

Yes, I've been pondering the same Young Jim. Surprising what meanders into the minds of old men...

Even with sparabara there is still an issue with the back ranks knowing that "range 100 paces, fire!" means they've really have to arc and pull (or whatever it is that archers do) to a range of 110 paces.

On the basis that with any overhead shooting there has to be a move away from near straight-line trajectory and a target you can see to some level of shooting "blindly" on command into the air, there is an implication of some sort of "would it be a good idea to practice first" creeping in.

I need to go back and review my rules to see if I've made rear support and skirmishing too efficient for Irregulars and Barbarians.

[Keraunos]

Just a thought, but are not most of the troops encountered in ancient warfare irregulars?  And as for who the barbarians are is this not purely subjective?

[Jim Webster]

A very high proportion of 'regulars' were rarely drilled citizen militia so regular can have a low bar. And barbarians merely didn't speak Greek 
But at the Elephant battle our account has Galatians opening ranks to allow their chariots to move through their ranks as a tactical surprise.
So yes I think we have to be wary of labels.

When I did my rules I thought I'd nicely avoided 'mixed units' other than Sparabara who I felt I'd done justice to.
Where there is a small number of archers, in proportion to the 'heavy infantry' I think just having them as being a 'sub-unit' of skirmishers who can screen the front, but if needed fall back to be a back rank where they may still be able to contribute a little.
 But it's when you get the situation where a unit is effectively half and half, then it's a case of getting the balance.
If the archers are in the front, then they'll fire as archers, but less effectively than a unit composed entirely of archers as there are fewer of them on the frontage.
When they're behind the spearmen, then there would be some ability to fire but much reduced, I'd probably rate it as the same as a similar frontage of skirmishers.
When the spearmen are in combat, I can see the archers being able to add to the depth of the unit. The fact that the archers weren't as well equipped for close combat probably wouldn't matter too much as by the time the other side has got through to them, the unit should be in deep trouble anyway.
The amount of drill needed to allow archers to move forward and back through their spearmen is probably not negligible, but we know that Persian armies often spent a lot of time drilling, and we know Roman Consuls often took time at the start of a campaign to drill their legions.

[DBS]

Might be worth considering Arrian's Ektaxis.  After all, he talks about a formation nine ranks deep.  First four ranks have kontoi, here assumed to most probably mean pila, but used primarily as a thrusting weapon against the expected cavalry charge,  Ranks five to eight have javelins, to throw over the first four ranks.  The ninth rank is auxiliary archers firing over all eight ranks.  Now, to be fair, they are drawn up on a hillside, so there is a degree of elevation for all ranks over the one(s) in front of them.  But unless one dismisses Arrian's work as a complete fantasy, it does seem that there was a credible option for missile fire from the rear half of a formation that was mixed in its weaponry.

Note that even with drilled Roman regulars, Arrian is here not suggesting any tactical interpenetration.  Of course, he is specifically talking about facing a potentially very fast cavalry attack, so that might make mucking about with skirmish lines falling back through close formation infantry a damned silly notion...

[Duncan Head]

Arrian may not suggest interpenetration, but note that the auxiliary archers in the ninth rank are drawn from different units to the legionaries of ranks 1-8; so arranging some degree of tactical co-operation between regiments, even of differing national origins, cannot have been that difficult.

[DBS]

Absolutely, I nearly said as much.  Now one can argue that they are all Roman regulars - legions and auxiliaries - but the very fact that Arrian is showing off his breadth of supposed tactical flexibility and innovation suggests that these units might not have trained for this as a matter of course; they simply could be told, more or less, to do it and be expected to make it work.  Is that testament to their excellent training and professionalism, or testament to it not being that difficult a concept in the first place?  (Probably both...)

[Jim Webster]

Any archer unit that drew up more than a couple of ranks deep, in reasonably close formation, is going to know about overhead fire.
So the sort of methods they used for getting people to fire at the correct range etc were probably reasonably well known. Certainly in areas like the Achaemenid Empire, it would be comparatively common knowledge amongst those 'in the military'.
It's just we haven't needed anything like that since 1500 (in round numbers) and we've forgotten

[DBS]

It also depends on what effect one is trying to have. Are you primarily trying to kill/wound the enemy, or primarily trying to disrupt the enemy?  Of course, the first is highly desirable, but the second may be more essential.  It is the logic behind the medieval arrow storm; perhaps only a small proportion of arrows find their mark, but it is a damned unnerving thing to experience, even if armoured, more so if not, and lots of sticks stuck in the ground may impede movement according to troop type.

The early Persian armies were fighting against enemies probably not that dissimilar in type to themselves. Victory therefore depends on training/experience, morale, leadership, numbers, perhaps quality of kit to some extent.  Greeks are different.  They are almost certainly (stand fast Spartans) not better trained or more experienced: those at Plataea may well have been much less so than, say, the Immortals.  They have a different style of fighting.  Now, the Ionians have not, it seems, overly troubled the Persians tactically, but that may be a question of numbers.  Marathon may be more an example of a failed, over-confident amphibious landing (the old where-are-the-cavalry question) than inherent superiority of the Athenians.  Plataea sees a decent sized Greek muster facing up to an expeditionary corps rather than the full Great Army.

Now, the Persians are clearly impressed by the Greeks, and start hiring hoplites as mercenaries.  Satrapal armies continue to have run-ins with Greek armies.  But how often do we have really large confrontations?  The problem is that we tend to think of hoplites as superior to Persians, because of 490-479.  But the Greek hoplite armies are one trick ponies; few cavalry, few light infantry.  The Persians are employing hoplite mercenaries as a tough heavy infantry element within a more heterogenous force.  The Ten Thousand are forced to improvise slingers and so on to survive once the rest of the mixed arms force has been stripped away.  Is this why we see the apparent disappearance of the sparabara?  Not that they are a bad idea, just that you now have mercenaries who can do the heavy infantry bit and one need not now worry too often about the great armies of the initial conquest period?

[dwkay57]

We seem to have wandered quite far off Jim's original topic, but we have hit upon our usual series of "not absolutely sure but possibly..." points, which are interesting (and probably repeatable i.e. we've discussed them in the past and will do so in the future) topics in their own right.

Training and a common language / drill book seem to be the key requirements for the efficient operation of mixed units. So, how you choose to combine the Assyrian spearmen and Chaldean archers is probably bound up in a mix of elements (bad pun not intended) with the level of abstraction probably being the key influencer as to which gain prominence.

[Erpingham]

As David says, I'm sure we have discussed some of this before. I think for me, if we are speculating, we need to be comparing like with like. One factor would be the number of archers to number of close combat types.  As I understand sparabara, archers heavily outnumbered spear and shield types. This led to deep formations which consequently meant that indirect shooting would need to be the norm. We brought in Arrian's Romans, who are nine deep but only the back rank are bow armed.  The sparabara could be intended to blanket an area with lots of arrows, whereas Arrian's archers probably just gave the close fighters some longer range potential if the enemy stood off or skirmished at a distance. Which sort of thing do we think the Assyrian/Chaldean combo had?

[Jim Webster]

If, as Duncan commented, to the Greeks, Assyrians were more Babylonians and if we assume the Chaldeans were recruited from the south of that area then they could be brigaded together at a pretty low level from recruitment.
Even if the Assyrians were from Assyria, they, along with the Chaldeans, would both speak Aramaic at this period so there should be no language barriers (dialects on the other hand?)
Often Persian armies spent a long time training once they were gathered together. Also, for example, Xerxes mustered his army in Cappadocia, then wintered in Sardis before marching onwards. So there was plenty of time for troops to be trained and get to know the units they would work with.

[stevenneate]

Have been looking at what Tamás Dezső (THE ASSYRIAN ARMY I. THE STRUCTURE OF THE NEO-ASSYRIAN ARMY 1. INFANTRY) says about Assyrian heavy infantry (as opposed to auxiliary infantry). He says (p.83)
"As has been mentioned above the regular archer – an archer wearing a pointed helmet and no scale armour – disappeared from the sculptures of Sennacherib (704—681 B.C.) and Assurbanipal (668—631 B.C.). The role of the regular archers was probably taken over by the different types of auxiliary archers distinguished in the previous chapter by their garments." (p.83)

and

"Further fragmentary Babylonian documents mention smaller or larger numbers of archers, even from the Neo-Babylonian and Persian periods as well, but the Neo-Assyrian system of recruiting vassal or auxiliary troops from the Babylonian cities seems clear: the conquered Babylonian cities, for example Nippur, Borsippa or Uruk – as allied partners of Assyria – equipped units of archers for the campaigns of the Assyrian army, for local police duties, for the defence of the cities, and above all for the border guard duties discussed above." (p.86)

He summarises that whist Assyrians were providing the spearmen and can be identified right down to Ashurbanipal (r.669-631 BC), readily identifiable Assyrian archers can't be seen supporting them but auxiliary archers are seen.  Perhaps this equates with the original question and some answers above that the Persian's Assyrians were spearmen and any supporting archers (if the Assyrians were deployed as such) were ethnically different. My conclusion that when "...Xenophon talks about 'Assyrian heavy infantry from Comania...", they are heavy infantry spearmen only. 

So, deploy the archers as a separate contingent of Babylonians or Aramaeans.

[Jim Webster]

I cannot claim to be an expert on the evolution of Assyrian infantry, but your comments do seem reasonable Steven
It does mean I am also adding another unit to the apparently infinite number of archers I'm half way through painting 

[Jon Freitag]

Interesting discussion.  Following up on Steven's lead, I pulled the same book off the shelf.  On page 108, Tamas states that a regular and auxiliary spearman was always under the cover from an auxiliary archer.  If Xenophon mentions Assyrian heavy infantry, I suggest he is referencing the combined spear/bow formation and not only spearmen. 

[Keraunos]

In my Cunaxa refight I had mixed spear & archer units facing the Greek phalanx with a single block of Assyrian spears outflanking the left of the Greek line.   This was not due to any historical assumptions but a result of play testing where I found that the hoplites would probably beat archer supported spearmen in a head to head conflict but if there were extra archers out on the flanks then, under the rules I was using, the hoplites at the end of the line would be stopped too easily.  The supporting spearmen on the flanks would give the mixed unit facing the hoplites a slightly better chance of standing up to the hoplites, adding an interesting touch of uncertainty to the scenario.